

EXHIBIT 2527

From: William Langewiesche [WLang@vf.com]
Sent: Sunday, February 18, 2007 8:28 AM
To: Steven Donziger
Subject: Confidential letter
Attachments: 07.doc

I'll call him. Thanks, Steve. Here's the letter.

W.

On 2/18/07 9:53 AM, "Steven Donziger" <sdonziger@gmail.com> wrote:

William:

828-296-9374 is his number.
call him after 5 pm EST today; he lives in Asheville, NC.

He can field questions about what this means, the scale of what they did as it relates to other oil-related disasters, how they could have avoided 50% of the damage if they just put concrete liners in the pits, and what the clean-up is going to entail and the unprecedented challenge of trying to attack a problem of this magnitude. This guy is sharp, creative, and comes out of the oil industry but he is not part of the establishment of so called remediation experts.

He does not want his name used, as he still works as a consultant to the industry. We have hired him to help us understand what the clean-up will entail and how much it will cost. He works for virtually nothing -- he is older and apparently does not need the money but loves the challenge of trying to figure this out.

I think you will find the interview really helpful and enjoyable.

Tks, SRD

February 17, 2007

Mr. Kent Robertson
Media Advisor
Policy, Government & Public Affairs
Chevron Corporation
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Dear Mr. Robertson,

It was a pleasure meeting you and Sarah McMillan in Quito last week, and I have carefully read the document you provided me, rebutting the plaintiff's claims. As I said to you then, I am traveling extensively in the area of Texaco's former concession, and am closely studying some of the technical and legal documentation associated with this case. I have also spoken at some length to the plaintiff's lead Ecuadorian lawyer, Pablo Fajardo and am currently sorting through materials provided to me by the plaintiffs' team in Quito. At this point I would like to ask ChevronTexaco a series of narrow questions, to which I would appreciate narrow and tangible answers, keeping in mind that I have visited a large number of well sites and separation stations, and am aware of U.S. and Ecuadorian laws and standards, present and past, and of the historical distinctions between Texaco and Petroecuador operations. You will notice that some of the questions overlap.

1. Who was the author (the "I") of the document "Addressing Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Big Lies?" Why is he not identified? When was the document written, and to whom is it distributed?
2. Why does the document not include footnotes to provide sources?
3. At any point during the period of Texaco's operations in Ecuador beginning in 1964, did Texaco have an environmental practices policy of any sort, either for the U.S. or the company's global operations? If so, would it be possible for Vanity Fair to obtain documentation? If such policy/documents evolved over the course of the Ecuadorian operations, would it be possible for Vanity Fair to obtain an early version (1970s) as well as a later one (1980s)? Did any such documents during this time contain policies relating to the disposal of produced water, the disposal of drilling muds, the burning of substances in earthen oil pits, or the burning of natural gas?
4. Does ChevronTexaco have such a policy/document today? Can Vanity Fair obtain a copy of it?
5. What was the policy of Texaco toward the indigenous people who traditionally inhabited the Ecuadorian concession in the early 1970s? What tangible attempts were made to mitigate the displacement or disruption of such peoples as a result of the building by Texaco of an infrastructure to extract oil from the Napo Concession?

6. What was the policy of Texaco toward the settlers who arrived in the concession area as the roads were being cut through the forest in the 1970s and 1980s? Did Texaco disseminate a document clarifying such a policy, and if so would it be possible for Vanity Fair to obtain a copy?
7. At a mid-point in the 1970s (1973? 1974? 1975?) what was the approximate size of the Texaco workforce in the area, including workers for subcontractors? Approximately how many of the workers were Ecuadorian nationals? Approximately how many were U.S. nationals?
8. At that time (1970's) on what technical and regulatory basis was the decision made to contain the drilling "muds" in unlined earthen pits (piscinas) at the well sites?
9. Were such unlined earthen pits in use by Texaco or Chevron at that time in Texas or California? If so, specifically at which well sites and where? Would you please provide documentation? At that time were such unlined earthen pits in use by Texaco or Chevron elsewhere in the world? If so, specifically where, and would you please provide documentation?
10. I know that the Texas Railroad Commission in 1939 effectively banned the storage of crude oil and waste products in unlined pits throughout the state of Texas, regardless of soil type, density of human population, or proximity to surface and subsurface waters. I also know that similar restrictions on unlined pits followed in other states. For what reason were unlined pits later used by Texaco in the Amazon?
11. What typically, or in any known instance, would have been the additional cost to Texaco of lining a pit with concrete?
12. Does Chevron still build earthen pits anywhere in the world to dispose of drilling muds, or for any other purpose? If so, where?
13. The plaintiffs have showed me the clause in the contract with Ecuador which obligated Texaco to respect the environment during operations, using technology and procedures according to best practices at the time. In what ways specifically was the technology in use in Ecuador different from that in use by Chevron or Texaco at that time in California or Texas?
14. What were Texaco's plans and methods in the 1970s and 1980s to dispose of the materials (drilling muds and waste products) contained in the pits at the Amazon well sites? Were those disposal plans and methods the same as those in use at that time in California or Texas? Can you provide me with relevant disposal documentation both from the US and Ecuador?
15. In the 1970s and 1980s what was the nature of the oily material that was sprayed on the dirt roads? Was this for purposes of dust suppression? What was the origin of that material?
16. During Texaco's two decades of production operations in the concession area, what were the specific methods and techniques used to treat the "produced water" at the separation stations before the water was released into the environment?
17. What was the range of salinity levels in the produced waters before and after such treatment? Were the salinity levels of the produced waters

- tested by Texaco, and if so, how often and using what methods? Can you provide me with documentation?
18. What was the range of heavy metals and other toxins in such water, before and after treatment? Did Texaco test the produced water for toxins after treatment? Can you provide me with documentation, including the results of any such testing?
 19. In your document referenced in question #1 and #2 (page 4, section 5, paragraph 4) you seem to be saying that the separation of crude in the separation stations was 100 percent efficient. Does this mean that absolutely no residual crude was released with the produced water?
 20. In your document referenced in questions #1 and #2, (page 4, section 5, paragraph 5) you state that the average annual volume of produced water discharged by Texaco in Ecuador was 1.7 percent of the volume of such waters discharged onshore in the United States in 1985. What is your source for the calculation? What was the nature of that discharge in the United States? Was the treatment of the produced waters in the U.S. the same as in Ecuador? Was the water discharged directly into watersheds in the U.S. in places where fresh water could be affected? Can you provide me with specific locations in California and Texas where this was being done by Chevron or Texaco in 1985?
 21. What percentage of Chevron and Texaco's produced waters onshore in the United States were re-injected in 1985?
 22. Your document states (page 4, section 5, paragraph 4) that the discharge of produced waters directly into the environment is currently in use in many parts of the world today. Can you tell me specifically where, and whether this continues to be the practice of ChevronTexaco anywhere in the world?
 23. If the produced water released by Texaco into the Amazonian environment was not harmful, as you say, what is the reason, as your document states, that the re-injection of produced waters is the preferred method of disposal in Ecuador today?
 24. Did Texaco use different in environmental standards in Ecuador during the time of its operations there, as compared with its operations in the U.S. at the same time? Does Chevron try to use different standards in the Lago trial today for environmental contamination, as compared to what it uses in California today? Can you answer this in reference to Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons (TPHs) and other specific toxins for which there exist norms both in Ecuador and the U.S.?
 25. Your document states (page 5, paragraph 2) that the health studies and writings of Dr. Miguel San Sebastian are funded by the plaintiffs. Can you provide Vanity Fair with evidence, documentary or other, to back up this assertion? Have you attempted to contact Dr. Sebastian to verify his financial connection to the plaintiffs?
 26. Your document cites the critiques of Dr. San Sebastian's work by three epidemiologists (Dr. Michael Kelsh, Dr. Felix Arellano, and Ken Rothman) whom it describes it as independent. Does this mean that they

- were not funded or otherwise subsidized by ChevronTexaco or its agents? Would you inquire on our behalf to see if Vanity Fair might e-mail or briefly speak to these men?
27. Has Chevron or Texaco ever funded studies or evaluations in the concession area of Ecuador to explore the impact of Texaco's operations on human health? If so, have the results been published in peer-reviewed journals? Can you direct us to such articles or publications?
 28. To the best of your knowledge, have any health studies published in peer-reviewed journals supported your document's claim that the health conditions in the Oriente region cannot be linked to oil-industry pollutants? If so, please direct us to such articles or publications.
 29. Conversely, are you aware of any studies published in peer-reviewed journals that support your document's statement that the health problems in the Oriente are likely the result of poverty, malnutrition, and poor sanitation? If not, on what basis does your document make such statements?
 30. Who are the "many physicians and epidemiologists" referred in your document who support your position on medical conditions in the Oriente? How many are there? Can you provide Vanity Fair with their names? Similarly, specifically which health organizations is your document referring to?
 31. During the Texaco operations prior to 1992 were any pits at the well sites or separation stations remediated and/or covered over with dirt? If they were remediated, what specific methods and standards were applied?
 32. It is my understanding that ChevronTexaco objects to the retroactive application of remediation standards in Ecuador. Is this true? Does ChevronTexaco reject such retroactive "cleanup" standards and civil laws in the United States, such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980?
 33. For the purposes of Texaco's remediation effort in 1995-1998, on what scientific or regulatory basis did the contract negotiated with the Ecuadorian government settle upon a Total Petroleum Hydrocarbon (TPH) standard of 5,000 ppm? Does ChevronTexaco consider a standard of 5,000 for TPHs to be protective of human health in areas where people live and rely on natural water sources, such as rivers and shallow wells?
 34. At that time what was the TPH standard in California? In Texas?
 35. Precisely what procedures were applied to the remediation of the pits during the cleanup effort of 1995-1998? Who did the work and how was it monitored? Would it possible to provide Vanity Fair with documentation?
 36. Can you explain the precise quality control and auditing procedures associated with the release from further liability? Was the Woodward Clyde work monitored by qualified independent technicians? If so, who were they?
 37. Is it true that water samples taken by Texaco after the remediation at the well site Sacha 10 showed nickel, cadmium, and phenols existing at levels

- several times higher than those permitted by the Ecuadorian clean-water regulation 2144 of 1989?
38. Is it true that Texaco tested the remediated sites by using the Toxic Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP)? If other procedures were used, what were they, specifically? Can you provide Vanity Fair with documentation?
 39. Has ChevronTexaco ever tested for Chromium 6 in the concession area? If such tests have been performed, can you provide Vanity Fair with documentation? If such tests were not performed, what is the reason?
 40. In its submissions resulting from field testing during the ongoing Lago Agrio trial, why has ChevronTexaco raised the allowable standard TPH to 10,000 ppm from its remediation standard of 5,000 ppm?
 41. What is the operational or regulatory basis for the “international criteria” repeatedly referred to in ChevronTexaco submissions at the Lago Agrio trial, such as in your lab reports for the Sacha 57 well? At that well site the ChevronTexaco report shows an “international criterion” for barium of 40,000 ppm, whereas Ecuador sets as a maximum limit 750 ppm. This is one of many cases in which the international criteria stated by ChevronTexaco would seem to require explanation. Can you provide Vanity Fair with documentation to support what you refer to as the international criteria?
 42. I have noticed in some Chevron lab reports documenting analysis of soils and water from site inspections in the Lago trial that values for TPHs exceed 8,000 ppm — for example at Lago Agrio Norte (8,400 ppm), or Shushufindi Suroeste (40,000 ppm), or Lago Agrio Central (96,000; 80,000; 8,000 ppm). These values appear to exceed the 5,000 ppm standard for TPH used during the remediation. Please explain how this could happen if the remediation was done properly.
 43. I understand that ChevronTexaco entered into an agreement with local Ecuadorian military authorities in Lago Agrio to house ChevronTexaco personnel on the Lago military base for at least some portion of the Lago trial. What was the reason for this?
 44. Given the history of the Ecuadorian military’s role in national affairs, and the known weaknesses of Ecuadorian political and judicial structures, was there concern at Chevron that the relationship between military authorities and ChevronTexaco might be prejudicial to the judicial process? If there was no such concern, can you explain for the lack?
 45. In your document referenced in questions #1 and #2 (page 1, section 1, paragraph 1) you state that 95 percent of the profits generated by consortium during Texpet’s operations went to the Ecuadorian government, and that about \$490 million went to Texpet. Can you provide Vanity Fair with similar financial calculations not for Texpet, but for the Texaco corporation, based on profits generated from sale of crude from Ecuador after it left the hands of the consortium?

Thank you very much for your help in these matters.

Sincerely yours,

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